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Music-Colour Synaesthesia:  
A Sensorimotor Account
Caroline Curwen
University of Sheffield, UK
Abstract
This article presents a sensorimotor account of music-colour synaesthesia, proposing a radically different 
perspective than is commonly provided. Recent empirical and theoretical work in music cognition moves 
away from cognitivist accounts, rejects representationalism and embraces an embodied standpoint. 
It has been shown that some forms of synaesthesia may be elicited from a concept alone and are often 
accompanied by shapes and textures. It is from this perspective that a skilful engagement with the 
environment and relevant sensorimotor contingencies may be identified. Here the role of embodied and 
enactive perception in general music cognition is extended to music-colour synaesthesia, and an argument 
is made for how the attributes of bodiliness and grabbiness might be found in a sonic environment, and how 
music listening might be perceived as an act of doing.
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Coloured hearing, or chromesthesia, is an umbrella term that includes music-colour synaesthe-
sia (Ward, Huckstep, & Tsakanikos, 2006). Synaesthesia has been described as “a union of  the 
senses” (Cytowic, 2002, p. 325) arising from the stimulation of  one sense (an inducer) trigger-
ing a reaction in an unstimulated second sense (a concurrent) (Grossenbacher & Lovelace, 
2001). This article examines the congruence between general music cognition and synaesthe-
sia, interpreting music-colour synaesthesia within the broader frameworks of  embodied and 
extended music cognition, in which action and interaction with the environment are central to 
music perception. It argues that music-colour synaesthesia is best understood as a sensorimo-
tor phenomenon, rather than understanding it as a particular neurological condition. This 
view resonates with recent research in embodied and enactive music cognition, moves away 
from traditional cognitivist accounts, rejects representationalism, and embraces a more situated 
standpoint (Krueger, 2009, 2011, 2014; Loaiza, 2016; Maes et al., 2014; Reybrouck, 2014, 
2017; Schiavio et al., 2017; Schiavio et al., 2019; van der Schyff  et al., 2018).
In order to come to a balanced perspective on music-colour synaesthesia as a sensorimotor 
phenomenon, this article provides, first, a brief  overview of  the phenomenon of  synaesthesia, 
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focusing on music-colour synaesthesia. Next, developments of  research in general music cog-
nition are outlined that describe engagement with music, including music listening, as an act of  
doing. The third section discusses how music-colour synaesthesia may indeed be explained from 
a sensorimotor perspective. The final section discusses challenges presented by synaesthesia to 
sensorimotor theory, and how these may be resolved arguing for a shift in perspective of  music-
colour synaesthesia from being regarded as special to being illustrative of  how typical, but indi-
vidualised music cognition may develop.
Synaesthesia
Researchers are beginning to challenge the assumption that a single mechanism underlies all 
forms of  synaesthesia (Auvray & Deroy, 2015), and Simner (2012), for example, rejects a one-
for-all explanation. Although synaesthesia has been described as a merging of  the senses, not 
all types are cross-sensory. Evidence shows that it can be activated by a concept alone (van 
Leeuwen et al., 2015); the inducer does not have to be physically present (Meier, 2014). For 
example, Dixon and colleagues (2000) found that synaesthetes responded to the concept of  7 
triggered by the presentation of  5+2 in the absence of  the actual number, and Ward, Tsakanikos, 
and Bray (2006) found that the concept of  musical notation was enough to elicit a synaesthetic 
response. These findings have led to the development of  alternative theories such as ideaesthesia 
(Jürgens & Nikolić, 2012; Nikolić, 2009), meaning “sensing concepts” (Mroczko-Wąsowicz & 
Nikolić, 2014, p. 4), connecting sensation and phenomenal experiences, or qualia, with their 
conceptual triggers or semantic inducers. Qualia is the term used to describe the qualities of  
subjective experience associated with certain sensory stimuli (see Jackson, 1982). In music, 
this might include the difference in experience between a melody played on a piano and the 
same melody played on a French horn (see also Curwen, 2018).
Synaesthetic experiences have been described by Wager (1999) as “extra qualia” (p. 264) 
that manifest themselves differently from synaesthete to synaesthete. Attempts to explain 
extra qualia associated with synaesthesia challenge philosophies of  mind such as representa-
tionalism: “the view that the phenomenal character of  an experience supervenes on its rep-
resentational content [or] the way an experience seems to its subject is . . . the way the 
experience represents the world as being” (Wager, 1999, p. 263). Tye (1998) ventures that 
phenomenal character must be identical to its representational content. The challenge to 
representationalism posed by synaesthesia is that it appears at odds with reality. Experiencing 
green in response to music does not mean the music is actually green, nor that the synaes-
thete is experiencing green-ness (Auvray & Deroy, 2015). There is much disagreement on 
this topic (see Curwen, 2018).
Differences between higher and lower synaesthetes, and between associators and projectors, 
further highlight the diversity of  synaesthetic manifestations. The distinction between higher 
and lower synaesthetes was first proposed by Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001), based on 
evidence of  cross-activation mechanisms operating at different times and in different locations 
in the brain. Lower synaesthetes were thought to process information at an early stage in the 
fusiform areas that manage form and colour perception, while higher synaesthetes were 
thought to process information at a later stage in areas that manage the conceptual aspects of  
colour. Associators describe their experience as being in the mind’s eye (Dixon et  al., 2004; 
Dixon & Smilek, 2005) or as knowing the colour (Ward et al., 2007), while projectors claim to 
see colours projected outside the body into external space (Smilek et al., 2001). It appears rea-
sonable to consider associators as higher synaesthetes and projectors as lower synaesthetes, 
but this has not been substantiated by research and in some studies the two dimensions of  
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synaesthesia are shown to be orthogonal (Ward et al., 2007). The crucial distinction between 
associators and projectors lies in the experience of  the concurrent, while that between higher 
and lower synaesthetes lies in the nature of  the inducer. Lower synaesthetes can perceive col-
ours in their mind’s eye, and higher synaesthetes can be projectors. These examples, among 
many others, illustrate that the potential scope of  music-colour synaesthesia is very wide.
Coloured Hearing
Tone-colour synaesthesia is the type of  music-colour synaesthesia examined most often: single 
tones and chords, isolated from any musical context, elicit specific colours. It has been attrib-
uted to neurological mechanisms, specifically bottom-up processing (see Music-Colour 
Synaesthesia below). However, the synaesthetic experience of  music is not just about the ability 
to assign a colour to individual tones or chords, nor is it just about sound (Mills et al., 2003). 
Timbre, tempo, and emotion mediate the experience, and some synaesthetes have to hear an 
entire musical piece to produce a synaesthetic response (Curwen, 2018). In this article I focus 
on higher, concept-driven, forms of  music-colour synaesthesia.
According to Peacock (1985) there are four broad categories of  musical inducer: composi-
tional style, timbre, tonality, and pitch (tone). Concurrents are almost always experienced as 
colour, but can also be experienced as shapes, spatial layouts and textures (Eagleman & Goodale, 
2009). Synaesthetes often experience more than one form simultaneously and in various com-
binations. For example, GS, the sole participant in Mills et al.’s (2003) study, experienced large 
blocks of  darker colours when hearing heavy metal music, and unpleasant colour combina-
tions when hearing music she disliked. The particular colours were influenced by changes in 
instrumentation or timbre, and higher and lower pitches were associated with lighter and 
darker colours, respectively. She also experienced shapes, texture, and movement creating land-
scapes that she referred to as maps, that moved at speeds in accordance with the tempo of  the 
music and were often easier for GS to follow than standard musical notation.
There are some similarities between synaesthetic experiences and typical non-synaesthetic 
cross-modal associations, such as those between pitch height and lightness (Eitan & Timmers, 
2010; Ward, Huckstep, & Tsakanikos, 2006) and pitch height, size, and brightness (von 
Hornbostel, 1925; Marks, 1974, 1987). Marks (1975) argues that the cross-modal mecha-
nisms underlying synaesthesia and general cognition are so similar that the former can be seen 
as a kind of  shorthand for the latter (p. 325).
Music-Colour Synaesthesia and General Cognition
Krueger (2011, 2014) argues that music helps individuals realise emotional and social experi-
ences in everyday life. According to the original extended mind thesis (EMT), cognitive processes 
are not confined to the head, nor even the body, but extend into the external world (Clark & 
Chalmers, 1998): a pen and paper aids calculation, a cane helps the blind navigate, and musi-
cal instruments facilitate music production (Chemero, 2018). The EMT has been expanded to 
propose a dynamic coupling system between subject and environment (Sutton, 2010; Kirchhoff, 
2012). Colombetti and Roberts (2015) explain that a “self-stimulating, coupled relationship is 
instantiated” (p. 1259) between a saxophonist and their instrument demonstrating that the 
relationship extends beyond “skull and skin” (p. 1244) to affective states: the sound produced 
by the instrument affects the player’s emotional experience, influencing what they play next. 
Reybrouck (2017) suggests that musical sense-making derives from the mediation of  cognitive 
events by sensorimotor interactions with the physical world, which may be multimodal. The 
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addition of  a visual modality to an auditory modality may make a listener aware of  previously 
hidden auditory information, modifying their perceptual experience. Interpreting synaesthesia 
in similar terms challenges the prevailing view that music-colour synaesthesia is a form of  
cross-sensory imagery with neurological origins.
Notwithstanding the rarity of  synaesthetic experiences, and their characteristic automatic-
ity and consistency, music-colour synaesthesia may not be so different from typical music cog-
nition. Barsalou’s perceptual symbol systems theory (PSS) explains how a conceptual system 
grounded in perception might work (1999, 2003). When people perceive objects, their basic 
sensorimotor experiences are captured as sensory symbols so that patterns of  activation estab-
lished during early sensory processing can be re-enacted subsequently. Conceptual systems 
derive from category knowledge, each category relating to a different component of  experience 
(Barsalou, 2003). Individual concepts are the product of  repeated re-enactments of  the pattern 
of  activation established when the object was perceived for the first time. These re-enactments 
are only partial, however; certain elements of  the original pattern of  activation evoked by the 
perception of  the object remain, but context determines the nature of  each subsequent re-
enactment, adding further multimodal sensorimotor information to previous perceptions of  
the object (Jacobson, 2013). As Zbikowski (2010) explains:
. . . a simulator for the category of  conjoined musical events associated with the term “perfect authentic 
cadence” could be established simply through multiple encounters with exemplars of  the category . . . 
such a simulator would not only include auditory information, but also extend to sensorimotor 
information about the feeling of  performing these events . . . introspective states associated with such 
cadences, and physical responses to hearing them (Zbikowski, 2010, pp. 35–36).
In music-colour synaesthesia, the concurrent might be mediated by new information that 
influences the conceptual content of  the stimulus. This information might consist of  timbre, 
emotion, tonality or musical style (Mroczko-Wąsowicz & Danko, 2014). There are many differ-
ent types of  synaesthesia, however, and in accordance with Simner (2012) who argues against 
a one-for-all explanation, and Auvray and Deroy (2015) who suggest that each type be con-
sidered separately, my aim here is not to propose a single underlying mechanism. Some syn-
aesthesias may be of  neurological origin, others genetic. Nevertheless, it is likely that higher, 




Cognitivist accounts of  musical experience propose representations and computations based 
on an input-output model (Lerdahl & Jackendoff, 1983; Nussbaum 2007): the sensory system 
receives a stream of  external information from which internal representations of  the real world 
are created (i.e., music processing). They do not consider the role of  the body; Fodor (1983) 
argued for the modularity of  mind, while more recent neurological explanations focus on the 
role of  areas of  the brain thought to be specialised for music (e.g., Peretz & Coltheart, 2003). 
These explanations are criticised (e.g., Di Paola et al., 2017; Fuchs, 2017; Gallagher, 2017; 
Varela et al., 1991) yet their core tenets are still endorsed. For example, Huron (2006) explains 
musical experience in terms of  an internal appraisal mechanism based on “some sort of  
weighted sum” (p. 110) of  different representations of  listeners’ expectations, while Sloboda 
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and Juslin (2010) explored the relationship between real emotions and their representation in 
the form of  emotional responses elicited from music. Yet musical experience is intersubjective 
and influenced by what individual listeners feel and what they do (Leman, 2008; Reybrouck, 
2006). People fulfil their social needs and experience well-being through musical engagement 
not by processing internal representations but by exploring the external, musical, environment 
(Krueger, 2009, 2011; Reybrouck 2010; Schiavio et al., 2017).
Ecological Approaches
Clarke (2005) applied ecological psychology, based on Gibson’s (1966, 1979) theory of  
affordances, to music perception. Affordances, according to Gibson, are what the environment 
“offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill . . . I mean by it some-
thing that refers to both the environment and the animal . . . it implies the complementarity 
of  the animal and the environment” (1979, p. 127). Consequently, perception is seen not as 
an internal process but as the result of  the ongoing relationship between the animal’s, or 
agent’s, whole perceptual system, rather than isolated receptors such as the ear or the eye, 
and its environment.
But what are musical affordances? Most scholars agree that music affords movement or 
some form of  entrainment (e.g., Clarke, 2005; Leman, 2008; Krueger, 2014; Reybrouck, 2005, 
2012). DeNora describes musical affordances as “moods, messages, energy levels, and situa-
tion” (2000, p. 44). A musical event may be an interactive exploration of  different “sonic 
affordances”, and a provider of  emotional and social affordances without which our ability to 
relate to others would be significantly diminished (Krueger, 2011). Krueger (2014) subse-
quently put forward a model of  the musically extended mind, explaining that music affords not 
just movement but also entrainment, observed as moving in time to the beat and sharing the 
experience with others. As an “emotion-extending resource” (2014, p. 9) musical affordances 
offer access to extended experiences and expressivity beyond those available to us in non-musi-
cal situations.
In their theory of  musical affordance, Menin and Schiavio (2012) propose an embodied, 
motor-based account emphasising the intentional nature of  the relationship between musical 
subjects and objects. When a skilled guitarist demonstrates a motor form of  intentionality by 
using their fingers on the strings in such a way as to reproduce a musical sequence, “this sen-
sory-motor process not only represents the basis of  musical understanding, but it can also shed 
light on the notion of  musical affordance, relying on a sub-cognitive, pre-linguistic, intrinsi-
cally motor form of  intentionality” (p. 210). Applying Ramstead et  al.’s (2016) cultural 
affordances framework to music performance, Einarsson and Ziemke (2017) argue that it is 
“the situation as a whole that has affordances” (p. 10), offering a still broader perspective.
Embodied Approaches
The rejection of  the distinction between action and perception is at the heart of  Gibson’s eco-
logical theory, and key to theories of  embodiment (Chemero, 2009; Leitan & Chaffey, 2014; 
Wilson & Golonka, 2013). Their proponents acknowledge the constitutive (i.e., essential) role 
of  the body in driving cognitive processes and dismiss the key role of  mental representations in 
the cognitive economy of  the living system (Thompson, 2007; Varela et  al., 1991). Should 
information be there for the taking in the environment, why would nature build an internal 
mechanism to do the same job (Rowlands, 2003)? Nevertheless, those who propose embodied 
approaches to music cognition have struggled to discard all aspects of  representation. For 
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example, representational structures are retained in Leman’s (2008) theory of  embodied music 
cognition, which otherwise describes the relationship between agent and environment, to cap-
ture the richness of  musical experience (see Schiavio & Menin, 2013). Recent research frames 
more “radically embodied” (van der Schyff  et al., 2018, p.13) and enactive approaches to musi-
cal engagement in the context of  musical emotion, communication, and meaning in commu-
nity music making, and musical creativity (Schiavio et al., 2017, 2019; van der Schyff  et al., 
2018). In contrast to approaches presenting music cognition as a series of  internal (i.e., com-
putational, neural) processes and representations, these approaches propose the direct, circu-
lar interaction between the agent’s body and its social, cultural, and physical environment 
(Reybrouck, 2014; van der Schyff  et al., 2018).
Sensorimotor Theory
Matyja (2010) highlights the importance of  O’Regan and Noë’s (2001) sensorimotor contingency 
theory (SCT) in an enactive approach to music cognition. SCT is an account of  perceptual con-
sciousness that attempts to explain qualia without reference to representation. It presents a new 
approach to perception emphasising the influence of  motor actions on changes in sensory stim-
ulation (Bishop & Martin, 2014). Focusing on visual experience, “the central idea of  our new 
approach is that vision is a mode of  exploration of  the world that is mediated by knowledge of  what we 
call sensorimotor contingencies [emphasis in original]” (O’Regan and Noë, 2001, p. 940).
SCT explains how an agent explores the environment, and how their attention is attracted 
by (unpredictable) attributes of  the environment described as bodiliness, grabbiness and insubor-
dinateness. The extent to which an agent makes use of  sensorimotor contingencies determines 
the quality of  their experience:
Bodiliness refers to the objectively quantifiable way in which bodily changes modify sensory input; for 
example, turning your head alters visual input, but has no effect on thoughts. Insubordinateness is the 
fact that bodily changes, though they have a systematic effect, do not completely determine sensory 
changes (sensory input can change without bodily changes occurring). Grabbiness concerns the fact 
that, due to basic properties of  sensory systems, sudden transitory changes in sensory input strongly 
grab our attention and cause perceptual processing to be focused on the sudden event (Degenaar & 
O’Regan, 2015, p. 2).
Sensorimotor Theory and Music
How can we relate this to music? If  an act of  listening to music is an interaction with the sonic 
environment (Krueger, 2009), relevant sensorimotor contingencies may be obtained in the 
following ways: bodiliness: turning towards the sound we hear; grabbiness: being alerted at a 
key or instrumentation change; insubordinateness (relating to aspects of  the sonic world 
beyond our control): music stopping unexpectedly, equipment failure, instrument failure.
If  SCT is about actively exploring the environment, doing and interacting, how can it be 
applied to music listening when we appear not to be doing anything? Yet doing denotes not only 
bodily movement, but also thinking, imagining, and standing still (Beaton, 2013). Listening to 
music offers affordances in the form of  our memory of  previous experiences of  musical engage-
ment (Myin, 2016).
Stewart et al. (2003) report empirical evidence for a sensorimotor role in reading and play-
ing music in a functional imaging study with non-musicians. Twelve learners undertook 15 
weeks of  musical training and carried out an explicit music reading task requiring them to 
press keys on an electronic keyboard. Their results were compared with those of  a control 
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group. Activation in the superior parietal lobe (SPL) was observed in the learners but not the 
control group. The researchers conclude that reading music involves a sensorimotor transla-
tion of  the notation to appropriate keypresses.
Some have argued that formal musical training is needed to achieve deep musical under-
standing (e.g., Kivy, 2002), whilst others have shown that an implicit understanding of  the 
structure of  Western tonal music can be acquired through exposure alone (Krumhansl, 2010). 
Importantly, formal musical training is not needed to obtain relevant sensorimotor knowledge. 
For example, Peñalba-Acitores illustrates how bodiliness and grabbiness might emerge during 
typical musical engagement (Peñalba, 2011, p. 222):
. . . our perception roams around different aspects of  the material, exploring melodies, instruments, 
chords, structure, and style; and we are aware of  that exploration through bodiliness . . . we will know 
that we are experiencing a crescendo because of  increasing tension in the muscles; and we will 
experience rhythm because of  the way that it allows us to synchronize our movements (virtual or 
actual) with the beat; This constitutes bodiliness.
Grabbiness, by contrast, captures the idea that the environment guides the subject in perception . . . In 
an orchestral piece, a listener might be more likely to be “grabbed” by timbre . . . Or we may be “grabbed” 
by the unexpected change from minor to major in a tierce de Picardie.1
Peñalba-Acitores also suggests that listeners unfamiliar with Indian music find it difficult to 
listen to at first because they attempt to apply the sensorimotor skills they have learned from 
listening to Western tonal music.
Music-Colour Synaesthesia
Neurological Theories
There are two primary neurological explanations for the cause of  synaesthesia, the disinhibited 
feedback theory (Grossenbacher & Lovelace, 2001) and the hyperconnectivity theory (Ramachandran 
& Hubbard, 2001). The disinhibited feedback theory suggests that a breakdown of  the barriers 
that normally keep modules and their processing completely separate permits a free flow of  
information from primary sensory areas to associated areas such as the parietal lobe or limbic 
system. In this way, if  feedback signals are not inhibited, later stages of  processing can influence 
earlier stages of  processing (Neufeld et al., 2012). According to the hyperconnectivity theory, 
both intermodal and intramodal synaesthesias are caused by a bottom-up process arising from 
unusual direct connections between different modules of  the brain such as visual and auditory 
areas. In infancy, there are many more connections between brain areas than in adulthood. 
These extra connections are normally pruned as the brain matures, yet in synaesthesia it is 
thought that this process is not completed fully, leaving some unusual connections behind (see 
Ramachandran & Hubbard, 2001, pp. 9–10). Both theories emphasise the role of  genetic factors 
for the cause of  synaesthesia and provide little role learning in its development. Yet synaesthesia 
may not just arise from inadequate neural pruning and weakened inhibitory re-entrant feed-
back. The reasons for such disinhibition or connectivity may be various.
Role of Concept
As previously mentioned, some synaesthesias can arise from a conceptual stimulus (Dixon 
et al., 2000; Mroczko-Wąsowicz & Werning, 2012; Mroczko-Wąsowicz & Nikolić, 2014; Ward, 
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Tsakanikos, & Bray, 2006) implying that synaesthetes may not be predisposed to synaesthesia 
but, rather, have learned to assign meanings to certain stimuli for the purpose of  strengthening 
their knowledge and understanding of  abstract concepts (van Leeuwen et al., 2015). Individual 
synaesthetes frequently disagree as to the specific colours and imagery associated with musical 
inducers, suggesting that the learned meanings assigned to stimuli are neither random nor 
universally applied.
Role of Body, Action and Environment
The similarities that exist between synaesthetic pairings and the cross-modal associations 
commonly made by the general population between colour, music, emotion, pitch-height and 
pitch size indicate that synaesthetes and non-synaesthetes employ comparable mental pro-
cesses (Gallace & Spence, 2006; Isbilen & Krumhansl, 2016; Marks, 1987, 2004; Mondloch 
& Maurer, 2004; Palmer et al., 2016; Palmer et al., 2013; Tsiounta et al., 2013; Walker et al., 
2010; Ward, Huckstep, & Tsakanikos, 2006). Both groups are exposed to similar learned 
cultural and environmental associations. For example, large objects make bigger and louder 
sounds on impact than smaller ones, and higher pitches are associated with smaller animals 
(Spence, 2011). Parise and Spence (2009) hypothesise that, according to Bayesian theory, 
pairings such as those between pitch and size are based on the individual’s prior knowledge 
that these cross-modal associations “go together” (p. 2) in the natural environment. Music-
colour synaesthesia may simply be a typical musical experience with “extra qualia,” as 
described by Wager (1999, p. 264), for some people. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the phe-
nomenological experience of  seeing the colour green when hearing the pitch class A presents 
a challenge to representationalism (Alter, 2006; Auvray & Deroy, 2015; Brogaard, 2016; 
Curwen, 2018; Rosenberg, 2004; Wager, 1999). Embodied and enactive music cognition 
research rejects explanations of  musical experience as a series of  internal cognitive processes 
(Reybrouck, 2005, 2012) and argues rather that “musical experience . . . is not something 
that is done to us” [but instead is] “something we do” (Krueger, 2011, p. 2). A more holistic 
and embodied approach to understanding musical experience (Schiavio & van der Schyff, 
2016) can be applied to the development of  a sensorimotor explanation for music-colour 
synaesthesia.
Synaesthesia and Sensorimotor Contingency Theory
Deroy and Spence (2013) suggest that the cross-modal correspondences underlying synaesthe-
sia may be grounded in sensorimotor associations:
. . .most people match angular shapes with the word “takete” while matching rounded shapes with 
the word “maluma” . . . it is the sharp vocal transitions made by the mouth when uttering the plosive 
sounds in “takete” that people map onto the sharp/angular shape . . . this cross-modal correspondence 
would then become “embodied” and grounded in sensorimotor associations (p. 1249).
However, it is important to acknowledge the challenges that synaesthesia poses to the basic 
assumptions of  sensorimotor theory, which Mroczko-Wąsowicz (2015) highlights in the fol-
lowing three objections:
1. Synaesthetic concurrents are generated internally, and do not arise from light reflecting 
from a surface, changing the angle of  the head, or eye saccades.
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2. Synaesthetic colour does not adapt away as in colour inversion in normal vision. It is 
generally consistent and unchanging.
3. Synaesthetes can tell the difference between synaesthetic colours and veridical colours, 
suggesting that synaesthetic colours lack perceptual presence (i.e., of  being real and 
existing in the world).
However, higher, concept-driven forms of  music-colour synaesthesia can be reconciled to sen-
sorimotor theory and the above objections resolved, as discussed below.
Synaesthetic Colours are Generated Internally
Synaesthesia has little to do with vision per se: “synesthetic visual responses to music aren’t 
affected by shutting or moving the eyes” (Ward, 2013, p. 51) and concurrents do not arise from 
normal vision. The colours experienced by associators are often described as being in the mind’s 
eye, or of  knowing a colour. Yet this does not mean that a synaesthetic experience is not the 
result of  an individual’s interaction with their direct environment. Affordances derived from 
interactive patterns in previous experiences of  musical engagement can be understood as 
“something we do now, in the light of  what we have done before” (Myin, 2016, p. 100). 
Similarly, Barsalou’s PSS theory proposes that a pattern of  activation established during early 
basic sensorimotor processing can be re-enacted subsequently (1999, 2003). For example, in 
other synaesthesia research, Mroczko-Wąsowicz and Werning’s (2012) presented two semi-
professional swimmers who associated synaesthetic colours with four swimming strokes 
(breaststroke, crawl, butterfly and back stroke). In a Stroop-like task (Stroop, 1935) both named 
colours faster when shown photographs of  swimmers in stroke-congruent colours. Simply 
thinking about or imagining the swimming stroke was enough to re-enact the original activa-
tion pattern and elicit a colour response; the strokes did not have to be executed physically.
Beaton (2013) argues that colour does not exist independently in the external world, nor 
just in our minds, but as the result of  our interaction with the world (see also Varela et al., 
1991) emphasising that learned associations are an important part of  individuals’ personal 
experience with colour, and what it means to them. For example, Gilbert et al. (2016) found 
that participants deliberately matched similar colours to similarly valenced emotion terms. 
Participants’ choices differed significantly as a function of  emotion and were moderated by sex 
and age. When participants in another study were asked to judge the effects of  colour on emo-
tion (Wilms & Oberfield, 2018), the combination of  hue, saturation, and brightness was impor-
tant, and Palmer and Schloss (2016) found that preferences for a particular colour were 
influenced by interaction with an object of  the same colour. Barsalou (2003) also emphasises 
the role of  personal experience when re-enactments of  original sensorimotor patterns are tai-
lored to the context of  the individual’s current situation. Personal experience may explain disa-
greements between synaesthetes as to the colours associated with the same inducer.
Visual perceptual experiences can be obtained from stimuli other than those produced by 
light reflecting from a surface, as demonstrated by the visually impaired with tactile-vision sub-
stitution systems (TVSS), as described by Bach-y-Rita and Kercel (2003), or other forms of  sen-
sory substitution such as The vOICe (e.g., Pasqualotto & Esenkaya, 2016). For example, the 
profoundly deaf  Scottish virtuoso percussionist, Dame Evelyn Glennie, writes of  how “my 
whole body is similar to an ear, every surface has learnt to become a conduit, bringing meaning 
and sense to my brain” (2016, para.11).
It can therefore be argued that what underpins music-colour synaesthesia is the develop-
ment of  a conceptual system, in the form of  sensorimotor features associated with a musical 
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inducer the first time it is heard, and enriched through repeated exposure. For example, the 
individual may experience, either as an instrumentalist or a listener, an intense emotional 
response to the music, associated with a certain group of  colours that in turn become associ-
ated with it. Different individuals presented with the same inducer experience it in different 
contexts, however, which would explain why different synaesthetes see different colours. A 
synaesthetic colour experience might be the result of  subsequent re-enactments of  the concep-
tual system while remembering, producing or listening to the music. For example, Ward, 
Tsakanikos and Bray (2006) showed that synaesthetic colour was determined by musical con-
text rather than mode of  presentation or form of  stimulus. In the notation of  Western music, a 
dot presented on the middle line of  a five-line stave has different meanings depending on the 
clef  (e.g., B in treble, D in bass). Synaesthesia is elicited at the conceptual level, so the same 
colour will be assigned to a D whether it is shown on the middle line of  a bass stave, below the 
bottom line of  a treble stave or as a letter, whether upper- or lower-case.
The variation in colour preferences from synaesthete to synaesthete for the same stimuli 
reflects the differences in the meaning of  the concept surrounding the stimuli for each indi-
vidual. According to Gardenfors (2004), concepts “are intrinsically dynamic entities, arising 
and adapting continuously as the agent engages with its environment . . . concepts are never 
free-floating entities but are always concepts for a particular agent, who comes with her own 
perspectival biases” (p. 170). Barrett (2011) makes an interesting link between Gibson’s 
affordances and Jacob von Uexküll’s Umwelt (1992). The notion of  Umwelt is described by 
Barrett as “the world as it is experienced by a particular organism” (p. 80) implying, as in 
Gibson’s theory, that the same environment will not offer the same affordances to each animal. 
An agent is only sensitive to those stimuli relevant to it from within its own environmental 
niche. For example, humans do not need to see ultraviolet light or hear very high-pitched 
sounds, neither do we need a heightened sense of  smell to detect and avoid other predators in 
the same environment. None of  these things forms part of  our Umwelt.
Reybrouck (2001, 2005) considers music listening relevant to Umwelt research, arguing that 
“dealing with music can be considered as a process of  knowledge acquisition” (2001, p. 623) 
dependent on the individual listener’s previous interactions with their sonic environment and 
the meanings that listener might attribute to the sounds. Reybrouck claims that “what is really 
important is not the acoustical description of  the sound, but the sounds as they are experienced 
by the listener” (2001, p. 618). Non-synaesthetes are happy to accept reality as it is presented to 
them: without unobtainable synaesthetic experiences (Eagleman, 2012). Similarly synaes-
thetes, whose phenomenal experience of  music includes colours, accept their wider Umwelt.
Synaesthetic Colours Do Not Adapt Away
Kohler’s (1964) study describes the experience of  wearers of  coloured goggles who report an 
adaption over time until the goggles no longer interfere with their normal vision. Yet, as Ward 
(2012) points out, it is often overlooked that the adaptation does not mean that the colours 
have returned to normal. The colours are still inverted, but the wearer has had to adjust to them 
to be able to navigate their environment with relative ease. In the case of  synaesthesia, seeing a 
synaesthetic colour does not impair the synaesthete’s ability to see veridical colour. An asso-
ciator’s colours held in the mind’s eye do not arise from light reflecting off  a surface (Ward, 
2012) so there is no need for them to disappear to accommodate veridical colours. Synaesthetes 
can see both veridical, and synaesthetic colours, just as well. For example, in Ward, Tsakanikos 
and Bray’s (2006) study synaesthetes were shown musical notes in congruent and incongru-
ent colours and asked to name their synaesthetic colour, ignoring the veridical colour. Although 
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a Stroop effect was observed, naming synaesthetic colours did not interfere with the synaes-
thetes’ normal vision. At no time did they see the written notation as anything other than its 
veridical colour, black. Notably, Mroczko-Wąsowicz (2015) suggests that there is no real need 
for synaesthetic colours to adapt away, as they do not carry the same colour information about 
the objects within the synaesthete’s environment as veridical colours (see p. 10). Synaesthetic 
colours associated with a musical event may instead provide information about a concept, emo-
tion, meaning, property or a previous action.
Synaesthetic Colours Lack Perceptual Presence
If  a synaesthete is aware that the colours they see are not veridical, how can their experience be 
viewed as an interaction with the real world, and how can the potential lack of  perceptual pres-
ence (of  being or existing in the world) be responded to? According to Noë (2001), perceptual 
presence can be explained by the practical mastery of  sensorimotor contingencies. For exam-
ple, we know what the reverse side of  a tomato looks like even though we cannot see it. Our 
sensory responses, elicited by the tomato, are such that we know how the tomato will behave in 
a variety of  situations.
But how can we account for phenomena such as synaesthesia, in which “raw sensory expe-
rience (‘qualia’) remains but perceptual presence is lacking” (Seth, 2014, p. 98)? Seth’s 
Predictive Perception account of  Sensorimotor Contingencies (PPSMC) accounts for normal 
perception and synaesthesia through the interpretation of  counterfactuals and predictive process-
ing. Generative models predict an outcome based on how sensory inputs would change in vari-
ous action situations, even if  those actions did not actually happen. The richness of  these 
counterfactually encoded sensorimotor contingencies determines the degree of  perceptual 
presence. Counterfactuals might be understood as statements of  what would occur if  some-
thing other than the present state of  affairs happened (e.g., the glass would break if  I were to 
drop it on the floor). A predictive model based on counterfactuals takes into account not just the 
likely cause of  a sensory input, but the likely cause of  a sensory input based on a repertoire of  
possible actions (Seth, 2014). Used in everyday science (Beaton, 2013), counterfactuals inform 
us how an interaction might occur between an agent and its environment in various scenarios. 
The interaction may, or may not, be carried out, but it could possibly happen in reality. Seth’s 
theory claims that the lack of  perceptual presence in synaesthesia is due to poor counterfactu-
als owing to a smaller, or non-existent, repertoire of  likely real-world sensory inputs.
This interesting account has received a number of  responses (Froese, 2014; Hohwy, 2014; 
Madary, 2014; Metzinger, 2014; O’Regan & Degenaar, 2014; Rouw & Ridderinkhof, 2014; van 
Leeuwen, 2014). Madary (2014) compares counterfactual richness in visual and other sen-
sory modalities where, in the latter cases, only some counterfactual information may be 
required for perceptual presence. For example, there are far more counterfactual possibilities 
available to us in vision than from sound. We can visually observe an object from many differ-
ent angles by moving our eyes alone, but fewer options are available to us from an auditory 
perspective. This might suggest that auditory input need be far less counterfactually rich than 
visual input to achieve perceptual presence. Madary proposes a modification to Seth’s proposal. 
Instead of  the degree of  presence depending upon the degree of  richness of  counterfactual 
information, “some counterfactual information” regarding sensorimotor contingencies is 
required for perceptual presence (p. 132). However, Madary questions whether even this modi-
fication might explain the apparent lack of  presence in synaesthetic concurrents, asking 
whether there are any sensorimotor contingencies in synaesthetic concurrents at all? Madary 
suspects not, but one might argue otherwise.
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Froese’s (2014) main challenge to Seth’s explanation is that counterfactual predictive pro-
cessing only appears to address perceptual presence and not the appearance of  reality, and that 
it is “the absence of  the latter, and not of  the former, that is an essential property of  synesthetic 
experience” (p. 126). By not distinguishing sufficiently between the two, Froese argues that 
Seth does not account for types of  synaesthesia that in fact might present some kind of  percep-
tual presence. While it may be more difficult to attribute sensorimotor contingencies to some 
forms of  synaesthesia than others, music-colour synaesthesia is often accompanied by shapes, 
textures and moving landscapes (Eagleman & Goodale, 2009) similar to the tunnels reported in 
spatial sequence synaesthesia (Gould et al., 2014). Although “this contextual space appears as 
distinct from the real world” (Froese, 2014, p. 127) counterfactuals by themselves cannot 
explain the lack of  reality of  concurrents, as the experience of  counterfactuals may remain 
surprisingly rich. An enactive account of  perception does not attempt to explain veridical expe-
rience in terms of  internal representation, but by how that experience “is shaped by the real 
world” (p. 127). Indeed, such phenomenal experience, as reported in music-colour synaesthe-
sia, might offer a perceptual presence in a similar form to those Beaton (2013) attributes to 
visual memory. Counterfactuals may operate even in imaginary contexts, and it is only the lack 
of  reality that distinguishes synaesthetic colour from veridical. Beaton (2013) claims that both 
visual memory and visual imagination are themselves types of  interaction with the world and 
gives examples of  how we are “poised to act” (p. 306) even when encountering hallucinations 
of  a unicorn, or an illusion of  a tomato. Although the unicorn does not and cannot exist in the 
world, we can gain an understanding, by using counterfactuals, of  how we would act if  these 
objects were actually present (Shoemaker, 1994). For example, O’Regan and Degenaar com-
pare a synaesthetic experience to the ability “to vividly imagine things that are absent” suggest-
ing that the relevant cortical activity remains “dangling” (2014, p. 131): in the sense that the 
cortical activity is not related to current sensorimotor events happening in the environment 
(Hurley & Noë, 2003). Indeed, Schubotz (2007) provides evidence supporting an explanation 
as to how a simulation of  events, including auditory events, may be realised in our sensory-
motor system, even those that we are unable to reproduce ourselves.
According to O’Regan & Degenaar (2014) “sensorimotor theory itself  already has the 
resources to explain synaesthesia” (2014, p. 131). Bodiliness, grabbiness and insubordinate-
ness are able to go beyond the idea of  explaining perceptual presence in terms of  counterfactual 
richness, and are equipped to explain all sensory experience. The argument here is that senso-
rimotor contingencies can be attributed to cases of  music-colour synaesthesia. We can imagine 
our interaction with tunnels and shapes in a moving spatial landscape or the expected feel of  
certain textures. Resonating with Barsalou’s PSS theory, a fragment of  the original sensorimo-
tor state might be placed in memory (Jacobson, 2013) explaining why a synaesthetic concur-
rent may appear disembodied from the original sensorimotor qualities of  its inducer. It may 
appear that a synaesthetic concurrent “seems to have little to do with the SMCs underwriting 
the perception of  the inducer” (Seth, 2014, p. 105), but once the sensorimotor contingencies 
of  experiencing red have been mastered, then red can be re-enacted in an atypical way.
Music-Colour Synaesthesia as a Variant of General Human Cognition
Although never directly referring to an enactive or sensorimotor approach, Sollberger 
(2013) stresses that the extent to which an individual is able to interact with their environ-
ment has an important functional role when characterising a perceptual experience as 
veridical. Furthermore, if  the perceiver is able to distinguish and interact with external 
objects in the world, then how the experience is embodied, whether as a taste or a coloured 
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sound, is irrelevant (Sollberger, 2009, pp. 151–152). Acknowledging that different types of  
synaesthesia might require different explanations for their cause, Sollberger argues that not 
all forms of  synaesthesia should be viewed as a non-veridical experience, and that some 
synaesthesias should be viewed as a “normal variant of  human perception” (2013, p. 171). 
Sollberger refers to music-colour synaesthesia as a form that presents to the perceiver some-
thing about their real-world environment. Specifically, synaesthetes with this type of  syn-
aesthesia are able to meet the following two conditions:
They literally attribute the sensory properties of  the synesthetic experiences to the distal stimulus itself.
They do not take their synesthetic experiences to be nonveridical, e.g., illusory or hallucinatory (2013, 
p. 173).
Sollberger (2013, p. 174) cites experiences from music-colour synaesthetes collected by 
Cytowic (2002):
A person who sings with little phrasing or variation in volume has a straight line voice. A baritone has 
a round shape that I feel. This is so obvious, it’s all very logical. I thought everyone felt this way. When 
people tell me they don’t, it’s as if  they were saying they don’t know how to walk or run or breathe 
(Cytowic, 2002, p. 28).
The shapes are not distinct from hearing them—they are part of  what hearing is. The vibraphone, the 
musical instrument, makes a round shape. Each is like a little gold ball falling. That’s what the sound 
is; it couldn’t possibly be anything else (Cytowic, 2002, p. 69).
The colours and shapes experienced in music-colour synaesthesia are a fundamental part of  
the phenomenal character of  musical experience, or the “what it is like” (Nagel, 1974, p. 437) 
to hear music, for synaesthetes (Chalmers, 1996; Shoemaker, 1994). Synaesthetes are often 
surprised to learn that not everyone experiences music as they do and cannot imagine experi-
encing music in any other way. Perhaps the question we should be asking is not, “what is it like 
to have synaesthesia” but, “what is it like not to have synaesthesia?”
Historically, synaesthesia has been examined as a sensory/perceptual condition distinct 
from typical cognition. Yet, many different types and sub-categories of  synaesthesia exist, and 
purely neurological explanations remain inconclusive. The similar mental processes employed 
by synaesthetes and non-synaesthetes (Simner, 2012) suggest that certain synaesthesias can 
be described in terms of  typical cognition. Recent research in general music cognition has 
moved away from a cognitivist approach, and explains musical experience via embodied and 
enactive theories (Schiavio et al., 2017; Schiavio et al., 2019). It is possible that certain forms 
of  synaesthesia may arise from purely neurological or genetic factors. However, the direction of  
research in general music cognition and in synaesthesia point to a sensorimotor approach as a 
promising next step in explaining the phenomena of  synaesthesia associated with music.
Conclusion
I have argued that music-colour synaesthesia should be examined not as a separate and distinct 
condition, but as a continuation of  typical perception and cognition. Research in general music 
cognition has embraced embodied and enactive accounts that include an active role for the 
body and its situated power of  action. Central to these accounts is how engagement with music 
might be regarded as an act of  doing, in accordance with Gibson’s theory of  affordances and 
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sensorimotor theory, and how certain attributes of  a musical environment attract a subject’s 
attention in the form of  their bodiliness, grabbiness and insubordinateness (Peñalba, 2011; 
Krueger, 2009). Yet actively exploring and interacting with a musical environment should not 
be restricted to physical acts of  engagement we more commonly associate with doing, but can 
extend to imagining and thinking (Beaton, 2013; Myin, 2016). Deep musical understanding 
can be acquired without formal musical training through attentive everyday listening 
(Krumhansl, 2010). I have described how a synaesthete can obtain a mastery of  sensorimotor 
contingencies and become poised to act (Beaton, 2013), and how the quality of  the synaesthetic 
experience is governed by a level of  “dangling cortical activity” (Hurley & Noë, 2003, p. 158). 
The similarities in the progression of  research in synaesthesia and general music cognition 
show how music-colour synaesthesia might be reconciled with a sensorimotor account and 
viewed as a “normal variant of  human perception” (Sollberger, 2013, p. 171). The phenome-
non of  shapes, colours and textures experienced on hearing music represents something about 
the real-world environment for the synaesthete, and is integral to their perception, experience, 
knowledge, and musical understanding.
These claims present an opportunity for future empirical research. Starting from the hypoth-
esis that synaesthesia associated with music is mediated by concept and context but grounded 
in sensorimotor action, the commonalities between the mechanisms underlying music-colour 
synaesthesia and general music cognition, might be tested. A group of  non-synaesthete musi-
cians could undertake sufficient training until they were able to produce a series of  triads on a 
keyboard to which they could reliably assign a specific colour. A Stroop-like task would verify 
that congruent colour-triad trials were produced with faster times and with fewer errors than 
incongruent colour-triad trials. In a second study, the newly trained group might be compared 
to a group with pre-existing music-colour synaesthesia. Ward, Tsakanikos, and Bray (2006) 
suggest that the involvement of  the superior parietal lobe (SPL) in sensorimotor transforma-
tions is likely to be important in synaesthesia. The application of  transcranial magnetic stimu-
lation (TMS) disrupts neural processing in the SPL. Both groups would undertake the Stroop 
task whilst receiving TMS over the right intraparietal cortex. It is expected that in the non-
congruent trials, interference would no longer be observed in either group as the TMS would 
un-bind the colour-triad associations.
I hope this article will encourage a shift in thinking about music-colour synaesthesia as well 
as promote investigations of  the role of  our sensorimotor system and actual as well as imagined 
interactions with the environment in various forms of  synaesthesia.
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Note
1. A tierce de Picardie (meaning a Picardy third) is the term given to the use of  a major chord in the final 
tonic chord of  a piece of  music in a minor key.
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